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Abstract
Mergers are structured in a variety of ways, in keeping with the underlying purpose of the
transaction. While this structural flexibility is beneficial from a financial standpoint, it has resulted
in varied interpretations of the case law surrounding the standards of review that govern conflicted
merger transactions. Where there is no apparent conflict of interest between the board of direc-
tors of a corporation and the corporation’s shareholders, the courts have traditionally accorded the
board deference under the lenient business judgment rule. On the other hand, where there is a
direct conflict of interest, the board is required to show the entire fairness of the transaction. How-
ever, conflicted transactions that fall in-between these two extremes have been reviewed in mixed
ways, ultimately resulting in shifts between the two standards of review. This Note argues that
there already exists an intermediate standard of review, the enhanced scrutiny standard, which ap-
propriately addresses the potential underlying conflicts of interest in such transactions. This Note
calls for the application of the enhanced scrutiny standard to all conflicted merger transactions
regardless of their structure, which would clarify existing law and provide a uniform standard of
review.
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ABSTRACT 
Mergers are structured in a variety of ways, in keeping with the 
underlying purpose of the transaction. While this structural 
flexibility is beneficial from a financial standpoint, it has resulted in 
varied interpretations of the case law surrounding the standards of 
review that govern conflicted merger transactions. Where there is no 
apparent conflict of interest between the board of directors of a 
corporation and the corporation’s shareholders, the courts have 
traditionally accorded the board deference under the lenient business 
judgment rule. On the other hand, where there is a direct conflict of 
interest, the board is required to show the entire fairness of the 
transaction. However, conflicted transactions that fall in-between 
these two extremes have been reviewed in mixed ways, ultimately 
resulting in shifts between the two standards of review. This Note 
argues that there already exists an intermediate standard of review, 
the enhanced scrutiny standard, which appropriately addresses the 
potential underlying conflicts of interest in such transactions. This 
Note calls for the application of the enhanced scrutiny standard to all 
conflicted merger transactions regardless of their structure, which 
would clarify existing law and provide a uniform standard of review.   
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INTRODUCTION 
This Note addresses the varying standards of review for mergers, 
which exist due to the myriad methods of negotiating such transactions. 
While the landmark cases Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 
A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) addressed the standards of 
review applicable in instances where the board of directors faced the 
threat of a hostile takeover, they did not address the level of scrutiny 
placed on a board in other instances. 
Several cases since then have narrowly addressed the issue, but 
each case is an isolated example of the level of care a board of directors 
must assert in a particular transaction. In Kahn v. Lynch Communication 
Systems, Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), the court required a review 
under the entire fairness standard. The Delaware Chancery Court in In 
re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421 (Del. 
2017]      CONFLICTED MERGER TRANSACTIONS 135 
Ch. 2002) further parsed the different standards of review based on 
whether the merger was a result of a negotiation or a tender offer. 
However, there still exists a lack of clarity as to whether the 
standard of review for a conflicted merger should be the entire fairness 
standard, the business judgment rule, or enhanced scrutiny. Configuring 
the standards of review based on the structural elements of the 
transaction has resulted in varying interpretations of the same basic 
principle. 
Finally, although a variety of literature exists on the roles of these 
cases in elucidating the standards of review for mergers, this Note will 
seek to consolidate the new standards set out by courts in recent years, 
and highlight the areas where clarity is still required. The Note will also 
propose a solution for addressing the potential conflict posed by the 
differing standards of review, and address any gaps in the law. The Note 
will serve as a useful outline of the information available to the board of 
directors of a corporation for assessing the scrutiny it might face if its 
decisions during a merger (or a similar transaction) are under review. 
Accordingly, Part I provides an overview of the existing standards 
of review for mergers, and their underlying principles; Part II discusses 
the conflicting case law, and highlights areas where there is a lack of 
clarity; Part III proposes a solution and calls for a consolidation of the 
standards of review for mergers involving a conflict of interest. 
I. MERGERS 
Companies merge for a variety of reasons: when they expect 
increased profits, anticipate a better competitive position, or simply wish 
to diversify the products and services they offer. Regardless, the manner 
in which these merger transactions are negotiated and ultimately 
structured has a huge impact on any judicial review that the transaction 
might face. As this Note shows, the different transactions are analyzed 
under differing levels of scrutiny, depending on the level of perceived 
conflict between the interests of the shareholders and those of the board 
of directors. 
 A. FORMS OF MERGER TRANSACTIONS 
Although mergers can be structured in a variety of ways, the two 
most relevant to this discussion are mergers accomplished by combining 
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two companies with diversified shareholders, and those configured as 
freeze-out transactions.1 
1. The A-B Merger: Combination of Two Companies with Diversified 
Shareholders 
This involves a negotiated merger between two companies A and B 
whose shareholders are dispersed. The transaction can be accomplished 
in two ways. 
a. Cash-based Transaction  
Company B’s shareholders are bought out and only A’s 
shareholders hold the resulting company AB’s stock. B’s shareholders 
are no longer invested in company B or AB. 
b. Stock-based Transaction  
Company A’s stock is given to B’s shareholders. Here, both A’s 
and B’s shareholders remain shareholders in the resulting company AB. 
2. The A-C Merger: Freeze-out Transactions 
This involves a merger transaction between company A and 
another company C, which is controlled by A. The transaction can be 
accomplished by buying out the minority shareholders of company C. 
As a result, company A owns 100% of company C’s stock, and C’s 
shareholders are no longer invested in company C.2 Freeze-outs can be 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Freeze-out transactions (also known as squeeze-out transactions or minority 
buyouts) involve one company’s merger with another company that the first one 
controls. “Control” in this context has been defined as the ownership of more than 50% 
of the company’s stock or “domination by a minority shareholder through actual control 
of corporate conduct.” Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 
(Del. 1989); see also Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) 
(finding that a shareholder exercised control over the corporate decisions despite its 
minority shareholder status). 
 2. A freeze-out transaction can be carried out as a one-step or two-step merger. A 
one-step merger would simply require the controlling company to buy out the minority 
shareholders. In a two-step merger, the controlling company makes a tender offer to 
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structured in myriad ways but the two types of transactions that are 
important to this discussion are freeze-outs conducted as typical 
negotiated mergers, and freeze-outs conducted via tender offers. 
a. Negotiated Merger 
Freeze-out transactions structured as typical negotiated mergers 
have the controlling party on both sides of the deal, involve a special 
committee with veto power, and are (by default) reviewed under the 
entire fairness standard.3 
b. Tender Offer 
In a tender offer freeze-out, company A makes a tender offer for a 
majority of company C’s shares, and then follows it with a short form 
merger.4 Such freeze-outs have a controlling party negotiating with 
minority shareholders, involve a special committee without veto power, 
and are afforded more deference under the business judgment standard.5 
B. FOUNDATIONS OF THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW: STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Standards of review exist to analyze the decisions of a board of 
directors, but they do not dictate a particular line of conduct that a board 
must follow in order to get deference from the courts.6 Standards of 
review simply “describ[e] what a plaintiff must plead or prove to 
overcome a defendant’s motion and ultimately prevail in the case.”7 
However, the standards of review are closely connected to the fiduciary 
duties that a board of directors must satisfy. 
                                                                                                                 
acquire at least 90% of the target company’s shares, and then instigates a short form 
merger. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2014). 
 3. Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 22 (2005). 
 4. See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2014). 
 5. Subramanian, supra note 3. 
 6. J. Travis Laster, Revlon Is a Standard of Review: Why It’s True and What It 
Means, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 26 (2013). 
 7. Id.; see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct 
and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993). 
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1. Statutory Requirements 
Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation Law sets forth 
the powers and duties of the board of directors of a corporation, 
bestowing upon the board the authority to make business decisions for 
the corporation.8 Section 251 of the Delaware General Corporation Law 
sets forth the conditions for a merger. It provides that a merger 
transaction requires the approval of the board of directors of the 
company as well as approval by a majority of shareholders.9 
Predictably, board approval is required to ensure that the 
transaction is viable for the corporation, while the shareholder vote is 
required to alleviate any concerns regarding potential conflicts of 
interest. These conflicts of interest can arise regardless of the manner in 
which the merger transaction is structured. For instance, in the merger of 
companies A and B as described above, there is the possibility that the 
board of directors of the target company B may resist an otherwise 
attractive offer of cash for the company’s stock because they have a 
personal interest in maintaining their employment after the completion 
of the merger. 
Contrastingly, in the merger of companies A and C above, 
company C’s board of directors may accept an inadequate offer to 
protect their employment once company C is absorbed into company 
A.10 In either scenario, there lies the potential that the board of directors 
may make a decision about the merger that may not be in the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 
2. Fiduciary Duties 
The board of directors owes a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to 
the corporation’s shareholders. Whether the board’s conduct has 
satisfied these duties determines the level of deference a board is likely 
to be accorded. In the first instance, the court looks at the board’s 
conduct to determine whether its acts were negligent. As long as the 
                                                                                                                 
 8. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (West 2014). 
 9. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2014). But see DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 
253 (West 2014) (stating that merger can be accomplished without a shareholder vote 
where the controlling corporation owns at least 90% of the shares of the target 
corporation). 
 10. See infra p. 151. 
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board of directors can show that its conduct was not grossly negligent or 
in bad faith, it can satisfy the duty of care and is given deference under 
the business judgment standard of review.11 Under this standard, the 
court declines to “substitute its judgment for that of the board if the 
latter’s decision can be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’”12 
Alternatively, the presence of a “qualified decision maker” can 
satisfy the court’s inquiry as well; if “an independent, disinterested, and 
sufficiently informed decision maker” exists, the court would ordinarily 
defer to its judgment under the business judgment rule.13 For a plaintiff 
shareholder to rebut the presumption of care inherent in this standard of 
review, it must prove that the qualified decision maker either “receiv[ed] 
a personal benefit from the transaction not received by the shareholders 
generally” or that the director “is a dual fiduciary and owes a competing 
duty of loyalty to an entity . . . on the other side of the transaction.”14 
The qualified decision maker is most likely to be an “independent, 
disinterested, and sufficiently informed” board of directors, but the court 
will also defer to a qualified decision maker in other instances. For 
example, stockholders collectively can act as qualified decision makers, 
as can a board committee.15 
Similarly, the duty of loyalty imposes on the board a duty: 
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation 
committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that 
would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or 
advantage . . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish 
loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict 
between duty and self-interest.16 
Consequently, when there is a direct conflict of interest—which violates 
the board of directors’ duty of loyalty—the entire fairness standard is 
applied. Where the board of directors of a corporation fails to act in the 
interests of the shareholders, the court must assess the transaction to see 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
 12. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985) (quoting 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
 13. J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on Enhanced Scrutiny, 40 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1443, 1443 (2013). 
 14. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 884 A.2d 26 (Del. 2005); Laster, supra note 
13, at 1452. 
 15. Laster, supra note 13, at 1456. 
 16. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
140 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
if it is objectively fair to the shareholders. The defendant-directors then 
have the burden of showing that the entire transaction was fair to the 
shareholders of the corporation, and that they acted in good faith.17 
The Delaware courts, however, soon realized that there were a host 
of transactions which did not fall into either of the above categories. The 
landmark decisions of the Delaware court in Unocal and Revlon gave 
rise to a third standard of review: the enhanced scrutiny test. Here, the 
measure is “range of reasonableness,” i.e., whether the board’s decisions 
were reasonable in the context of the transaction.18 As described by the 
court in Unocal, the enhanced scrutiny test requires the directors to 
show “(i) ‘reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate 
policy and effectiveness existed’ and (ii) a response to the danger that 
was ‘reasonable in relation to the threat posed.’”19 The Revlon case 
further developed this standard, and held that in the event where the sale 
of a corporation is imminent, the duties of the board of directors shift 
“from the preservation of [the company] as a corporate entity to the 
maximization of the company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ 
benefit.”20 
The driving principle behind the Delaware court’s decisions in 
Unocal and Revlon is that there are “potential conflicts of interest 
present in a negotiated acquisition.”21 Many factors can influence the 
board of directors to act in a manner that undercuts the best interests of 
the corporation and its shareholders without resorting to acts that would 
constitute self-dealing.22 The enhanced scrutiny standard was developed 
to deal with these subtleties, which exist not only when the board is in 
complete control of the corporation but also during the period of the 
corporation’s final sale.23  
                                                                                                                 
 17. See Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 952. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Laster, supra note 6, at 9 (quoting Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 955). 
 20. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 
1986). 
 21. Laster, supra note 6, at 7. 
 22. Id. at 18. 
 23. See id. at 16. 
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II. DIFFERING STANDARDS OF REVIEW FOR CONFLICTED MERGER 
TRANSACTIONS 
This part of the Note traces two parallel (and occasionally 
overlapping) paths in the case law defining the standards of review for 
mergers: one, a result of Revlon’s application of Unocal, and the other, a 
series of developments in the doctrine of freeze-out mergers. 
A. THE A-B MERGER: ISSUES WITH APPLICATION OF THE STANDARD SET 
FORTH IN UNOCAL/UNITRIN/REVLON 
In Unocal, the board of directors was faced with a shareholder who 
executed a two-tier tender offer for shares of the corporation. The board 
responded to the inadequate offer with a plan to execute a self-tender for 
the company’s shares while excluding the plaintiff shareholder. The 
Unocal court famously held that: 
[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting 
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation 
and its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for 
judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the 
business judgment rule may be conferred.24 
This heightened examination of the board’s decisions gave rise to the 
enhanced scrutiny standard of review. However, it is important to note 
that even within Unocal, there was a de-escalation of the standard of 
review after the court’s initial inquiry. The enhanced scrutiny standard 
was effectively part of a two-step inquiry into the board’s decision-
making.25 Once the court determined that the board’s actions were 
“reasonable in relation to the threat posed,” and thus, passed the 
enhanced scrutiny test, the court deferred to the board under the business 
judgment rule.26 
In Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 
1995), the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the application of the 
enhanced scrutiny standard laid out in Unocal. In Unitrin, the board of 
directors of the corporation was faced with an offer by American 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 954. 
 25. William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function over Form: A 
Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 
1287, 1310 (2000). 
 26. Unocal Corp., 493 A.2d at 949. 
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General Corporation. The board rejected the offer, on the grounds that it 
was inadequate.27 American General, however, announced its plan for a 
hostile takeover, and the board of Unitrin adopted a buyback plan as part 
of its defensive measures against the threat.28 The court held that in 
instances where the corporation faces the threat of a hostile takeover, 
courts must examine first, whether the defensive measures adopted by 
the board of directors are “draconian, by either being preclusive or 
coercive and; second, . . . whether [the measures are] within a range of 
reasonable responses to the threat.”29 
Here, the court applied Unocal and examined the board’s actions 
under the two-pronged test of reasonableness and proportionality.30 The 
court found that the board of directors met the reasonableness prong 
based not only on the board’s belief that American General’s offer was 
inadequate but also because of “the presence of a majority of outside 
independent directors.”31 The court also held that the board’s response in 
adopting a repurchase program was proportional to the threat it faced 
without “depriv[ing] the public stockholders of the ‘power to influence 
corporate direction through the ballot.’”32 
The court in Revlon further extended the enhanced scrutiny 
standard to the sale of a corporation. In Revlon, the board of directors 
faced a hostile takeover by Pantry Pride.33 In response, the board first 
adopted several defensive measures, which the court found to be 
reasonable in response to the takeover threat.34 However, once the board 
realized that the sale of the corporation was inevitable, it began 
selectively dealing with another buyer, Forstmann, to arrange a 
leveraged buyout.35 Balancing deference to the business judgment of the 
directors with “the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting 
primarily in its own interests,” the court in Revlon found that the board 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1369 (Del. 1995). 
 28. Id. at 1370. 
 29. Id. at 1367. 
 30. See id. at 1373. 
 31. Id. at 1375. 
 32. Id. at 1383. 
 33. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 
1986). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
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had failed to meet its responsibilities under Unocal.36 Once the sale of 
the corporation was imminent, the court held that “[t]he directors’ role 
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged 
with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the 
company.”37 
The case law since then has interpreted Revlon as requiring the 
board of directors to satisfy a specific set of duties when the sale of a 
company is inevitable. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time 
Incorporated, Paramount made a tender offer for Time’s shares shortly 
before Time finalized a stock-for-stock merger with Warner.38 
Paramount sought to enjoin the Time-Warner merger after Time rejected 
its offer as inadequate, but the court declined.39 Paramount claimed that 
the Time-Warner merger agreement required the board to obey its 
Revlon duties, and thus “to treat all other interested acquirers on an 
equal basis” in order to maximize the value of the company for the 
shareholders.40 The court held, instead, that the board had no specific 
responsibility to transact with the company offering the highest 
immediate value for the shareholders outside the context of Revlon.41 
The court further described two scenarios that would trigger Revlon 
duties: 
The first, and clearer one, is when a corporation initiates an active 
bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business 
reorganization involving a clear break-up of the company. . . . 
However, Revlon duties may also be triggered where, in response to 
a bidder’s offer, a target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks 
an alternative transaction involving the breakup of the company.42 
According to this analysis, unless the sale or breakup of a 
corporation is imminent or inevitable, Revlon duties are not triggered. 
Keeping in line with this reading of Revlon, the court here held that 
there was no “abandonment of the corporation’s continued existence,” 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id.; see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); 
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). 
 37. Revlon, Inc., 506 A.2d at 182 (Del. 1986). 
 38. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 1149. 
 41. Id. at 1151. 
 42. Id. at 1150. 
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and thus, no further Revlon analysis was needed.43 The court also found 
that the board reasonably perceived a threat, and adopted a reasonable 
defensive measure.44 Accordingly, the board’s decisions passed the 
enhanced scrutiny review under Unocal, and thus, the board’s actions 
were given business judgment deference.45 
In another case involving Paramount, the court faced a similar 
question. Paramount was in talks with Viacom regarding the possibility 
of a merger.46 Eventually, the Paramount board approved the 
transaction, the terms of which included a number of defensive 
measures.47 During this time, Paramount was also approached by QVC 
but the board eventually rejected QVC’s bid because the directors did 
not deem it to be in the “best interests of the stockholders.”48 When the 
Paramount-Viacom transaction was challenged, the court found that the 
Paramount board had failed to meet its duties under Revlon.49 
Unlike the court in Time, which relied primarily on the absence of 
an inevitable sale of the company, the QVC court gave great significance 
to the sale of control of the corporation in assessing whether the Revlon 
duties were triggered.50 The QVC court reasoned that “[w]hen a majority 
of a corporation’s voting shares are acquired by a single person or entity 
. . . there is a significant diminution in the voting power of those who 
thereby become minority stockholders.”51 This change in control of a 
corporation triggers the application of Revlon duties because the board is 
once again under an obligation to maximize shareholder value.52 The 
QVC court further clarified that an imminent sale of the company was 
not the only scenario that would result in the application of Revlon 
duties.53 Applying this standard, the court held that the Paramount board 
had failed to meet the enhanced scrutiny review. 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 1151. 
 44. Id. at 1152. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 
1993). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 41. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 42. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 46-47. 
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Taken together, the Paramount cases seem to imply differing 
standards of review based on how the transaction was conducted. If the 
transaction results in a controlling party, Revlon applies.54 However, if 
there is no controlling party, Revlon still applies in a cash-based 
transaction but not in the case of a stock-for-stock merger.55 
What is problematic, however, is that the Paramount cases presume 
that there exists a set of specific Revlon duties in the first place: 
One view of the holding in Revlon was that it was premised on a 
duty (the duty to auction the company when it was for sale, or, less 
woodenly, the duty to get the best price, or the duty not to 
discriminate between bidders) that was different in some way from 
ordinary director duties . . . . [O]nce a “sale” of the corporation was 
in contemplation, “Revlon duties” would be thought to limit the 
range of good faith business judgment that the board might make.56 
The Delaware courts quickly squashed this interpretation, holding that 
the Revlon case “did not create a new or special regime.”57 As Vice 
Chancellor Laster stated, “Revlon merely identified one special 
circumstance in which the board of directors had narrowed the 
investment horizon for maximizing stockholder value to a specific point 
in time.”58 Thus, Revlon should not be read as creating new duties for 
the board of directors which did not exist previously.59 Rather, Revlon, 
like several cases that followed it, only sought to outline what 
compliance with the pre-existing duties would look like in the context of 
a sale.60 
B. THE A-C MERGER: FREEZE-OUT TRANSACTIONS 
The emergence of freeze-out transactions further complicated the 
application of the enhanced scrutiny standard of review. Freeze-out 
                                                                                                                 
 54. See J. Travis Laster, Exposing a False Dichotomy: The Implications of the No-
Talk Cases for the Time/Revlon Double Standard, 3 DEL. L. REV. 179, 187 (2000); see 
also J. Travis Laster, Revlon is a Standard of Review, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5, 
37 (2013). 
 55. J. Travis Laster, Exposing a False Dichotomy: The Implications of the No-Talk 
Cases for the Time/Revlon Double Standard, 3 DEL. L. REV. 179, 187 (2000). 
 56. Equity-Linked Inv’rs, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1045 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 57. Laster, supra note 55, at 201. 
 58. Id. at 205. 
 59. Id. at 204. 
 60. See generally Laster, supra note 55. 
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transactions have been subject to differing standards of review based on 
the procedural and substantive context of the merger. Freeze-outs 
structured as negotiated mergers have typically been reviewed under the 
entire fairness standard, while those structured as tender offers have 
been afforded the more lenient business judgment review.61 
1. Negotiated Merger 
The landmark case Weinberger v. UOP addressed the standard of 
review applicable to freeze-outs conducted as typical merger 
transactions. The facts of this case are as follows: Signal had a cash 
surplus and invested some of its cash by acquiring a majority of UOP’s 
stock via a tender offer.62 Then, failing to find any other attractive 
investment opportunities for the remaining cash surplus, Signal began 
assessing the possibility of acquiring the remaining outstanding shares 
of UOP.63 In the negotiations that followed, two UOP directors who 
were also employees of Signal prepared a “feasibility report” for Signal 
but failed to disclose this material information to the other, outside UOP 
directors.64 The report mentioned that Signal could profitably acquire the 
outstanding UOP shares “at any price up to $24 each,” a fact that was 
not disclosed to the independent directors of UOP.65 In fact, the price 
actually proposed to UOP’s board and its minority shareholders was $21 
per share.66 The court in Weinberger drew upon the duty of loyalty 
principles, and opined that “[w]hen directors of a Delaware corporation 
are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their 
utmost good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the 
bargain.”67 The court held that the transaction would be reviewed under 
the entire fairness test, which (among other showings) must include a 
showing of fair price and fair dealing.68 
In the cases that followed Weinberger, there was a lack of clarity 
over the standard of review applicable in cases where a cash-out merger 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See supra Section I.A.2. 
 62. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983). 
 63. Id. at 705. 
 64. Id. at 705, 707. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 707. 
 67. Id. at 710. 
 68. See id. at 710-11. 
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had been approved by an independent special committee.69 Delaware 
courts were divergent in their application of Weinberger: some cases 
held that the presence of an independent committee only operated as a 
burden-shifting mechanism, while others contended that the committee’s 
approval de-escalated the standard of review to the business judgment 
rule.70 Kahn v. Lynch Communications clarified this split, and 
established entire fairness as the applicable standard of review in freeze-
out mergers.71 Based in part on the court’s holding in Weinberger, the 
court in Lynch held that: 
[t]he initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests upon the party 
who stands on both sides of the transaction. However, an approval of 
the transaction by an independent committee of directors or an 
informed majority of minority shareholders shifts the burden of 
proof on the issue of fairness from the controlling or dominating 
shareholder to the challenging shareholder-plaintiff.72 
In order to trigger the burden-shifting mechanism, however, the special 
committee must also be “truly independent, fully informed, and [have] 
the freedom to negotiate at arm’s length.”73 As is apparent in the court’s 
analysis, the court declined to apply business judgment review, even if 
the transaction had been approved by either an independent committee 
or a majority of the minority shareholders. “[The] Court recognized that 
it would be inconsistent with its holding in Weinberger to apply the 
business judgment rule in the context of an interested merger 
transaction, which, by its very nature, did not require a business 
purpose.”74 
The court in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide75 outlined the procedural 
protections that must be in place in order to de-escalate the standard of 
review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule, as applicable 
to freeze-out mergers. In M&F Worldwide, a controlling shareholder 
sought to buy out the outstanding shares of MFW, subject to approval 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490 (Del. Ch. 1990); 
see also Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. Ch. 1991). 
 70. See Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994). 
 71. See id. 
 72. Id. at 1117 (citation omitted). 
 73. Id. at 1120-21; see also Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 
1985). 
 74. See Lynch, 638 A.2d at 1116. 
 75. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
148 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
by MFW’s board of directors, an independent special committee, and a 
majority of the non-controlling shareholders.76 While the plaintiffs 
argued that even the combination of these procedural safeguards could 
prove to be insufficient in guarding the interests of the minority 
shareholders, the court held that the business judgment standard would 
apply to the transaction if: 
(i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the 
approval of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority 
stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii) the 
Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors 
and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special Committee meets its duty 
of care in negotiating a fair price; (v) the vote of the minority is 
informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.77 
The court here ensured that a variety of procedural protections had to be 
in place in order to neutralize the power of the controlling party to 
influence the transaction. 
2. Tender Offer 
Tender offer freeze-outs have typically been accorded business 
judgment review because the controlling party is only on one side of the 
transaction, eliminating the threat of self-dealing that is present in the 
typical freeze-out mergers.78 One instance of this is the court’s holding 
in In re Siliconix.79 In that case, the majority shareholder sought to 
acquire all of the remainder of the company’s stock via a cash tender 
offer, which was then changed to a proposal for a stock-for-stock 
transaction after the special committee rejected the offered share price.80 
The controlling shareholder proceeded with the transaction without the 
special committee’s approval.81 The transaction was nonetheless subject 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 640. 
 77. Id. at 645. 
 78. Subramanian, supra note 3, at 18; see also Solomon v. Pathe Commc’n Corp., 
672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996). 
 79. See In re Siliconix Inc. S’holder Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 WL 716787 
(Del. Ch. 2001). 
 80. Id. at *2-4. 
 81. Id. at *4. 
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to approval by a majority of the minority shareholders.82 The court held 
that the controlling shareholder had “no duty to offer any particular 
price, or a ‘fair’ price, to the minority shareholders of Siliconix unless 
actual coercion or disclosure violations [were] shown,” and 
consequently declined to apply the entire fairness standard of review.83 
This holding derives partly from the law established in Solomon v. Pathe 
Communications where the court held that without evidence of coercion 
or inadequate disclosure, the tender offer is deemed voluntary, and thus 
there is no duty to offer a certain price.84 
However, the courts soon recognized the inherent imbalance in 
negotiations between controlling parties and minority shareholders in 
tender offer freeze-outs. In In re Pure Resources, Inc., the court sought 
to reconcile—at least in part—“the divergent policy choices made in 
Lynch and Solomon” by nesting the principles of Solomon within the 
analysis under Lynch.85 The court held that the entire fairness standard 
of review would apply to such transactions if the tender offer is 
coercive.86 The offer would be deemed non-coercive only if it was 
“subject to a non-waivable majority of the minority tender condition,” 
“the controlling stockholder [promised] to consummate a prompt § 253 
merger at the same price if it [obtained] more than 90% of the shares,” 
and “the controlling stockholder . . . made no retributive threats.”87 
However, these factors are all in control of the controlling shareholder, 
and minority shareholders have no way of challenging them. 
As noted earlier, the Paramount cases apply the enhanced scrutiny 
standard of review in two instances: one, where the transaction is cash-
based, and two, where the transaction is stock-based but also results in 
the presence of a controlling shareholder after the transaction.88 This is 
primarily because the voting power of the resulting minority 
shareholders significantly weakens.89 However, as Vice Chancellor 
Laster has argued, the underlying principle of this standard is the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. at *4. 
 83. Id. at *6. 
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 87. Id. at 445; see also DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2014). 
 88. Laster, supra note 6, at 6-7. 
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presence of potential conflicts of interest, which exist in all negotiated 
transactions, whether they are conducted in cash or stock,90 and whether 
they are in the form of a freeze-out merger or a freeze-out tender offer. 
Understandably, if the transaction uniquely benefits a controlling 
party to the exclusion of other shareholders, the appropriate standard of 
review is entire fairness, even if a qualified decision maker exists.91 In 
that case, “neither a special committee nor a majority-of-the-minority 
vote . . . [nor] [a]n independent stockholder vote” alone is enough to 
deescalate the standard of review from entire fairness.92 The special 
dynamics that exist within a corporation in the presence of a controlling 
party essentially neutralize the power of committees and independent 
stockholder votes (and, in the case of tender offers, the stockholders’ 
tenders of their shares) because the controlling party exerts influence “at 
both the board and stockholder levels.”93 However, as seen in Lynch, the 
presence of a special committee or a majority-of-the-minority vote can 
shift the burden on to the plaintiff shareholder, requiring it to establish 
that the transaction was unfair. This burden-shifting mechanism, 
however, is not at play in the case of freeze-outs conducted as tender 
offers.  
What remains unclear is whether the standards of review for all 
freeze-outs (whether conducted through tender offers or as typical 
mergers) should be streamlined into one. Although M&F Worldwide did 
unify the standard of review for both types of freeze-outs by de-
escalating the standard of review for typical freeze-out mergers to 
business judgment review instead of entire fairness, the unification of 
the standards only occurs if the procedural protections outlined in M&F 
Worldwide are applied by the board and deemed acceptable by the 
court.94 As seen above, for freeze-out transactions, the procedural 
protections can be challenged and may lead to a burden-shifting 
analysis.95 If the court’s inquiry is satisfied, the standard of review for 
the board’s conduct again shifts dramatically from one extreme to 
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another.96 It is important to note, however, that these concerns do not 
arise in freeze-out tender offers: there is nothing for the shareholder to 
challenge there, as long as the board refrains from making threats.97 
Additionally, the standards of review for freeze-out mergers remain 
entirely removed from the enhanced scrutiny standard set out in Unocal 
and Revlon, even though the underlying principle behind the latter 
cases—addressing conflicts of interest that endanger stockholder 
interests—seems to be present in freeze-out transactions as well. 
Specifically, in a typical freeze-out merger, the controlling party is on 
both sides of the transaction, and in a tender offer freeze-out, the 
controlling party often has disproportionate bargaining power compared 
to the minority shareholders with whom it negotiates. Both of these 
circumstances endanger the shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, as has 
been noted in current literature, the business judgment review afforded 
to all tender offer freeze-outs may not be sufficient to look after the 
interests of the minority shareholders, while an “entire fairness review 
for all freeze-outs may deter some value creating transactions.”98 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTION: UNIFIED STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR 
CONFLICTED TRANSACTIONS 
A. APPLYING THE UNOCAL/REVLON ENHANCED SCRUTINY STANDARD TO 
FREEZE-OUT MERGERS 
There is an intermediate standard of review that is available to 
address the imperfect extremes of judicial review under the business 
judgment standard and the entire fairness standard. The enhanced 
scrutiny review, applied above to A-B merger transactions,99 should be 
made available to A-C merger transactions as well. 
As discussed earlier, the potential for conflicts of interest lies in A-
B and A-C transactions because the board may feel compelled to act in 
ways that betray its allegiance to the corporation and the corporation’s 
shareholders.100 Although A-B and A-C mergers are structured 
                                                                                                                 
 96. See M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 635. 
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differently, this conflict is at the core of both types of transactions.101 In 
both instances, the intermediate level of scrutiny serves to address this 
issue: that there may be instances where the board’s conduct is not 
grossly negligent but where the “omnipresent specter” is nonetheless at 
play.102 The intermediate scrutiny standard will also guard against 
instances where the qualified decision maker, if one exists, is unable to 
act as intended in the presence of such conflicts of interest. 
Thus, enhanced scrutiny should be the appropriate standard of 
review for conflicted transactions, even those that employ procedural or 
substantive protections to safeguard the interests of minority 
shareholders. Adopting the enhanced scrutiny standard for mergers 
involving conflicts of interest would extend the application of the case 
law established by Unocal and its progeny beyond the traditional 
negotiated transactions, and apply it to the many forms of freeze-out 
transactions. Applying the enhanced scrutiny standard would also 
eliminate a two-step review, and prevent the de-escalation from one 
extreme level of review to another. 
B. INTERPRETING M&F WORLDWIDE AND SILICONIX AS SATISFACTION OF 
THE BOARD’S DUTIES UNDER REVLON 
Before enhanced scrutiny can be effectively applied to such 
mergers, however, there needs to be a final clarification of the duties of 
a board under Unocal and Revlon. As Vice Chancellor Laster has 
discussed (and contrary to popular interpretation), there does not seem 
to be a set of specific Revlon duties that a board must undertake when 
the sale of a corporation is imminent.103 The enhanced scrutiny standard 
cannot be effectively applied to freeze-out transactions until the board’s 
duties have been clarified, especially because freeze-out transactions are 
analogous to final-sale transactions because they result in the buyout of 
minority shareholders.104 Finally, as Vice Chancellor Laster contends, 
“the perceived double standard for director conduct in change-of-control 
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transactions and stock-for-stock mergers is a false dichotomy . . . there 
are no special and distinct Revlon duties.”105 
The aim of the Revlon duties is to ensure that the board of directors 
treats all bidders equally in the event of the corporation’s sale.106 These 
so-called Revlon duties then apply only in that context (or in an 
analogous one).107 This Note proposes that in order to grant enhanced 
scrutiny review to mergers involving conflicts of interest, cases such as 
M&F Worldwide and Siliconix should be viewed as describing the ways 
in which a board of directors can satisfy its fiduciary duties under each 
case’s particular circumstances. This would consolidate the divergent 
case law and bring clarity by enforcing a uniform standard of review. 
M&F Worldwide and In re Pure Resources should be viewed as 
satisfying the court’s analysis under enhanced scrutiny review for 
freeze-out transactions conducted as typical mergers and via tender 
offers, respectively. Under this interpretation, the enhanced scrutiny 
standard would still maintain the flexibility to prescribe how a board 
may satisfy its duties in a particular instance. Thus, if A-C mergers are 
reviewed under the enhanced scrutiny standard (traditionally applied to 
A-B mergers), then M&F Worldwide and its antecedents can be nested 
under the Unocal/Revlon analysis. 
In proposing a unified standard of review for all mergers where 
there is a conflict of interest, this Note does not contend that the 
business judgment review and the entire fairness standard are obsolete. 
Rather, those two standards of review are at opposite ends of the 
spectrum, and should be applied where there is either an obvious 
violation (or lack thereof) of the board’s fiduciary duties. In all other 
transactions involving conflicts of interest, the courts should apply 
enhanced scrutiny as a one-step standard of review. 
CONCLUSION 
Delaware doctrine on the standards of review for mergers has its 
roots in the landmark cases of Unocal and Revlon. However, the 
analysis employed in these cornerstone cases needs to be effectively 
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applied to the complex and varied structures of merger transactions in 
order to ensure the balance between the preservation of shareholder 
interests and the maintenance of a board’s autonomy to make business 
decisions. In the extreme instance where the board of directors is 
embroiled in a glaring conflict of interest, the courts should certainly 
require the board to demonstrate that the entire transaction was fair to 
the shareholders. At the opposite end of the spectrum, where it is 
apparent that the board made a reasonable business decision, the courts 
should continue to accord the directors the protections of the business 
judgment rule. 
For transactions that hold the possibility of a conflict of interest and 
that threaten to disrupt the balance between shareholder interests and 
board autonomy, there exists a fitting intermediate standard of scrutiny 
as set forth in Revlon and Unocal. The enhanced scrutiny standard is 
based on the principles of balancing the sometimes-conflicting interests 
of those who make the decisions and those who are most affected by 
them. Despite the several forms of structuring merger transactions, this 
tension between the conflicting interests almost always exists. 
It is only appropriate then, to apply a uniform standard of review to 
these transactions instead of altering the standard to accommodate the 
structural complexities of the merger. While calling for this uniform 
standard’s application to mergers involving a conflict of interest, this 
Note does not suggest that the Delaware courts’ holdings over the last 
four decades should be disregarded entirely. Rather, the Note argues that 
the courts’ holdings over the years should be merged into the enhanced 
scrutiny standard itself, instead of the vacillation between entire fairness 
and business judgment review. The enhanced scrutiny review, alone, 
efficiently looks after conflicting interests that lie at the heart of many 
merger transactions. 
